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Of prime importance in enacting a legislative bill into law is
the question of whether or not the bill as enacted will stand up
under judicial scrutiny when its validity is attacked in court. The
validity of a statute is generally questioned on the ground of some
constitutional defect under the federal or state constitution de-
pending on the circumstances and may either be a matter of sub-
stance or procedure. It is the purpose of this paper to examine
the problems involved from a procedural point of view as they
have arisen in the State of Ohio.1
The fundamental questions are (1) the attitude of the courts
when they are requested to look behind the enacted bill to discover
defects in its passage, and (2) in any event, if defects are alleged
to exist, whether such defects will be considered by the court in
determining the validity of the measure.
By way of introduction into the first above mentioned question
it may be stated that the conflict is between the enrolled bill itself
as precluding any further search of the records and the journal
kept by the legislative body of its activities as the controlling in-
strument. The words "enrolled bill" have accumulated many shades
of meaning but in general they refer to a bill which has been passed
by both houses of a legislature and signed by the presiding officers
thereof. Such may also include the signature of the governor and
the filing of the bill with the secretary of state.2 As to the journal
in Ohio, it is a constitutional requirement and must be published.'
Throughout this country, the courts have adopted various
theories in approaching the question of the validity of a statute.4
One such view is that the enrolled bill is conclusive and no evidence
will be admitted to show that required procedure was not followed
in its passage or that the contents of the enrolled bill differ from
the contents of the bill as passed by the legislative body. A second
view holds that the enrolled bill is prima facie correct and only
when the legislative journal affirmatively shows an omission of a
* State Senator from The Twenty-Fifth District in Ohio.
I The problems under discussion here are not peculiar to Ohio. For in-
formative matter as to other jurisdictions see the following secondary sources:
46 Mica L. Rsv. 989 (1948); 32 IowA L. Rv. 147 (1946); [1941] Wisc. L. REv.
439, 15 NEB. L. Bur.. 233 (1937); 21 IowA L. REv. 538 (1936); 3 Rocxy Moux-
TvAN L. Rav. 38 (1936).
2 SUr AND, STATUTES AtM STATuToRY CoasmucuTox, § 1401 (3rd 1943).
3 OHIO CONST. Art. 11 § 9.
4 Ritzman v. Campbell, 93 Ohio St. 246, 112 N.E. 591 (1915); SuTRmmLAn,
supra § 1402.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
constitutionally-required procedural step will the enrolled bill be
invalidated. Still another theory holds the enrolled bill is prima
facie correct but evidence from the journal or from any other re-
liable source may be offered to show that the requisite procedure
was not followed or that the enrolled bill differs in content from
the bill as passed. A fourth and last view holds that the bill is
valid only if the requisite steps are shown by the journal to have
taken place.
In Ohio, the leading case of Ritzman v. Campbells established
the enrolled bill theory as to the contents of a measure and handed
down a dictum that went almost that far as to procedural require-
ments. In this case the court said 6:
Meanwhile an enrolled bill bearing the solemn attestation
that it was signed by the presiding officers of each house
while the same was in session and capable of doing busi-
ness, and which thereafter was presented to and signed by
the Governor and by him filed with the Secretary of State,
must, if the legislative journal shows it to have received
the necessary constitutional majority be considered to be
what it purports to be, and not under any circumstances
subject to impeachment as to its contents or the mode of
its passage.
It will be noted that the court provided an exception as to
procedure, indicating that the journal must show the bill received
the constitutional majority. Authority for this approach developed
out of the earlier case of Fordyce v. Goodman 7, which held that
when the question of whether a bill has been passed by the requisite
number of legislators is raised, the journals are proper evidence to
determine the answer. While this represents an apparent deviation
into another theory mentioned earlier, the court offered a very
practical justification, pointing out that to hold otherwise would
open the door for presiding officers to enact a bill without the
proper vote. Further, until the journal itself is produced to show
that the requisite number of votes was not received, the enrolled
bill will be presumed to have received the required constitutional
majority.8
Occasionally a question arises as to the authoritativeness of
the certified copies of the enrolled bills published in the volumes
of Ohio Laws under the authority of the secretary of state. Such
copies are prima facie evidence of the law and may be controverted
by reference to the enrolled bills10 but not to the journals of the
5 Ritzman v. Campbell, supra.
6 Ritzman v. Campbell, supra, at 263.
7 Fordyce v. Goodman, 20 Ohio St. 1 (1870).
8 Hilton v. State ex rel. Bell, 108 Ohio St. 233, 140 N.E. 681 (1923); Steam-
boat Northern Indiana v. Milliken, 7 Ohio St. 384 (1857).
9 State ex rel. Rogers v. Price, 8 Ohio C.C. 25, 4 Ohio C.D. 296 (1893).
10 State v. Groves, 8 Ohio St. 351, 88 N.E. 1096 (1909).
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legislature.1
Turning now to the second question involved in this discussion,
namely, what limitations the court will consider in testing the
validity of a bill, the law of Ohio seems clear. The Constitution of
the State of Ohio provides for the reading of a bill fully and dis-
tinctly on three different days, unless this provision is properly
waived.12 As to this provision, the court will not travel behind
the enacted bill to see if compliance therewith has been had, holding
this provision to be merely directory in its nature and not manda-
tory upon the legislature. 13 This. last statement was made con-
crete in the later case of Tim v. Nicholson14 which dealt with the
constitutional provision that no bill shall contain more than one
subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.'5 . This limini-
tation was held to be intended only as a permanent rule for pro-
ceedings in the legislature and therefore directory. The court said
it would not be considered in determining the validity of the bill.
The safeguard suggested by the court was the legislators' regard
for and their oath to support the constitution of the State.
However, as to other provisions they have been labeled as
mandatory,16 which in effect is saying that non-compliance will
result in invalidating the bill.
The Ohio Constitution provides that no law shall be passed
in either house without the concurrence of a majority of each
House's members.'7 This is clearly a mandatory limitation on the
legislature.' 8
Presentment of a bill to the governor for his approval and the
subsequent filing of a bill which is subject to referendum with the
secretary of state are of a similar import.19
In the case of State v. Kiesewetter20 the court held section 17
of Article 11 of the Constitution of Ohio was mandatory and there-
" Ritzman v. Campbell, supra, note 4. Contrary expressions in early low-
er court cases are, of course, without authority. See State ex rel. Rogers v.
Price, supra, Burke v. Cincinnati, 10 Ohio Dec. 542 (1900).
12 Omo CONST. Art. II § 16.
13 Miller and Gibson v. State, 3 Ohio St. 475 (1854). But see Bloom v.
Xenia, 32 Ohio St. 461 (1877).
14 Tim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio St. 176 (1856); Ohio ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Cov-
ington et al., 29 Ohio St. 102 (1876); Seeley v. Thomas, 31 Ohio St. 301 (1877);
Well v. State, 46 Ohio St. 450, 21 N.E. 643 (1889); Jones v. County Commis-
sioners et al., 2 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 14, 15 Ohio C. D. 510 (1903).
15 OHO CONST. Art. II § 16.
16 Ritzman v. Campbell, supra.
1 Omo CONST. Art. I § 9.
18 Ritzman v. Campbell, supra; Fordyce v. Goodman, supra.
19 Werde v. Richardson, 77 Ohio St. 182, 82 N.E. 1072 (1907) (As to presen-
tation to governor).
20 State v. Kiesewetter, 45 Ohio St. 254, 12 N.E. 807 (1887).
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fore the presiding officers of each house must sign the bill publicly
in the presence of the house and while it is in session and capable
of doing business, or the bill is invalid and open to attack. As a
practical matter, due to time limitations on the printing of bills,
each House of the General Assembly oftentimes meets in skeleton
session in order that this requirement may be met, without keep-
ing the entire membership present for such purpose. Inasmuch as
no roll call is taken on these days, the journal affirmatively fails
to reflect the absence of a quorum, and it is problematical as to
whether any court would question the procedure.
Directly related to this problem and necessary to a more com-
plete understanding is the theory of the court concerning impeach-
ment of the journal, or what evidence the court will admit in order
to establish the facts as they differ from those reported in the
journal.
In the interesting case of Wrede v. Richardson", the court al-
lowed reference to be made to (a) the "Minute Book" kept in the
governor's office, (b) to receipts given by the governor's clerk,
and (c) to a statement written on the enrolled bill itself to show
that the bill in question has been presented to the governor and
had become a law without his signature. The court, in this case,
refused to admit the testimony of witnesses to the effect that the
governor had not been presented with the bill and that he had
been ill and had not been at his office at the time the bill was al-
legedly presented to him. The court was of the opinion that the
Minute Book was admissible because it was kept, like the legis-
lative journal, in accordance with law. The protection of the
governor's daily record here is in line with the general rule apply-
ing to the journal; namely, that it cannot in cases of legislative
procedure be impeached.22
Outside the realm of legislative procedure, the journal has
been the subject of two important cases. The first case, State ex rel.
Loomis v. Moffitt 23 , decided in 1832, came up on a writ of quo
warranto to test the authority by which one Moffitt undertook the
duties of a judgeship. A direct attack was made on the legislative
journal, and the court held that the journal could not be contra-
dicted by the parol evidence of one individual member, the journal
being the action of the whole body and not of a single member.
The doctrine of the Moffitt case was departed from in Harbage v.
Tracy 24, decided in 1937. In this case, the journal indicated that
21 Werde v. Richardson, supra.
22 State ex rel. Rogers v. Price, supra; State ex rel. Herron v. Smith, 44
Ohio St. 348, 7 NX.. 447 (1886).
23 State ex rel. Loomis v. Moffitt, 5 Ohio 358 (1832).
24 Harbage v. Tracy, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 553 (1937), affd. 64 Ohio App. 151
(1939), app. diss'd. 136 Ohio St. 534 (1939). For a complete discussion of this
case, see 5 OHIO ST. L. J. 213 (1939); 25 Mu. L. REv. 528 (1941).
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the legislature had been in session during a particular period, when
in fact it had not. The court permitted the journal to be impeached
by extrinsic evidence saying,25 :
... we are of the opinion that such a manifest mis-
statement of facts cannot be shielded from scrutiny which
would develop the truth by the claim that the journals
of the two houses may not be impeached.
In the light of these decisions, it would seem to be a fair con-
clusion that the general rule of not permitting the legislative
journal to be impeached still exists, but an exception will be
made if manifest fraud is made known to the court.
SUMnAY
One may well inquire as to the grounds upon which the Ohio
Courts have accepted the enrolled bill theory in preference to the
others. The court, in the Ritzman case 6 stated that practical con-
siderations made this the only wise rule. At the end of every legis-
lative term literally hundreds of bills are passed and presented to
the enrolling clerks who are compelled to work under exhausting
pressure. Under these circumstances there are bound to be some
discrepancies between the bills which are passed and the bills as
they are actually enrolled. To look behind the enrolled bill would
result in the invalidating of a great many statutes and it is doubt-
ful if any useful public purpose would be served.
As to the second view, holding the journal conclusive if it
affirmatively shows the omission of a step, it appears to be an un-
workable solution. The journal will seldom if ever affirmatively
indicate an omission.27
The third approach permitting evidence from the journal and
any other reliable source to impeach the enrolled bill, is the most
liberal view and while not the law in Ohio, it is gaining favor.28.
To hold the journal conclusive, and the bill valid only if the
requisite steps are shown to have been taken on its face is the
most unworkable of all the theories. This fact was recognized by
the court in the Miller case,29 in which the court said:
If a strict, literal compliance with every constitutional
requirement, however, minute, is necessary to the validity
of a law, and the courts are bound to hold that nothing
was done but what appears in the legislative journal, it is
easy to demonstrate that not a single statute enacted since
the constitution took effect can be upheld.
25 Harbage v. Tracy, supra, at 162.
26 Ritzman v. Campbell, supra.
27 Ohio cases supra, will for the most part bear this out, except as to the
requirement that the statute must have received the majority of votes set forth
7)y the constitution.
28 SUTRLaD, supra, § 1402.
29 Miller v. State, supra, at 481.
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On final analysis, it seems that the Ohio courts have accepted
the most workable solution available, admitting that human beings
do err, and have made the theory flexible enough to permit ex-
ceptions when sound reason demands.
In dividing the constitutional limitations into directory and
mandatory classifications, the courts have done so on their own
authority, there being nothing in the constitution to indicate any
difference. It appears that the courts have made directory those
limitations which are not inherently essential to the validity of a
bill, and have at the same time maintained the dignity of the con-
stitution, by putting the legislators on their honor. To those who
would argue that the constitution ought to be followed to the
letter, it might be said that the realistic approach of the courts
gives the words of the constitution a workable interpretation and
is therefore preferable.
Over all, the law of Ohio concerning these problems generally
is comparatively clear and definite. The decisions have created
a workable framework which permit legislator and practitioner
alike to understand and cope with legislative procedure in Ohio.
